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Two studies examined certain discrepancies which have been con- 
sidered important evidence in support of interpersonal comparison 
(value-adherence ) explanations of group induced shifts in choice. 
These are (a) the differences between a person’s own choice 
and the choice he predicts others would make and (b) the differ- 
ence between the former and the choice he admires. Findings from 
the first study indicate that own choices are more extreme than 
those a person predicts others would make because he is more 
certain and confident about the former than the latter, not because 
he wishes to appear to outdo others as interpersonal comparison 
theories of choice-shift effect would have it. The second study 
strongly suggests that extreme choices are admired not because 
they display maximal adherence to a social ideal but because they 
imply that the person’s solution to a problem involving choice is 
well-founded, that he has persuasive reasons for the choice. On the 
whole the evidence bodes well for explanations of choice-shift 
effects based on persuasive argumentation and poorly for those 
relying on interpersonal comparison processes. 
Despite prolonged sermons (e.g., Moscovici & Lecuyer, 1972) and brief 
laments (e.g., Smith, 1972) to the contrary, research on group induced 
revisions in individual choice-the ill-named “risky shift”-has in fact 
progressed to where critical experimentation seems possible. The issues 
at hand in this area have to do with the necessary and sufficient conditions 
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for producing such shifts. There are two distinct theoretical views. One 
stresses interpersonal comparisons and the other, persuasive argumen- 
tation-reflecting the common distinction between normative and in- 
formational processes ( Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). 
Interpersonal comparison theories also often referred to as value 
theories (Levinger & Schneider, 1969; Jellison & Riskind, 1970; Pruitt, 
1971b), all argue that the shift is due to normative processes. For 
instance, according to Brown ( X365), upon comparing himself with 
others and learning his choice is relatively moderate, a group member 
experiences some distressful emotions-fear of disapproval, loss in self- 
esteem, etc. This unfortunate state of affairs is said to come about be- 
cause the member believes such moderation does not reflect adequate 
adherence to widely cherished social values. To avoid further discomfort, 
this individual abandons his initial choice for one he thinks will demon- 
strate proper adherence, a choice which will make him at least as ex- 
treme as most other members. A more detailed review of these approaches 
to the choice-shift effect appears in Cartwright ( 1971), Pruitt (1971a,b), 
and Vinokur ( 1971) . 
Persuasive-arguments theory (St. Jean, 1970; Vinokur, 1971; Vinokur & 
Burnstein, 1974) attributes shifts in choice to informational processes 
which commonly occur during individual and group problem-solving. It 
assumes that a particular decision brings to mind a set of standard 
arguments in support of the various alternatives among which the person 
must choose. A member’s initial choice is said to be due to the kind of 
persuasive arguments available to him. The shifts in choice following 
discussion are assumed to result from the sharing of arguments which 
were only partially available to the average member prior to discussion. 
A more thorough presentation of this approach can be found in Burn- 
stein and Vinokur ( 1973) and in Vinokur and Burnstein (1974). 
Two main research strategies have been used to examine interpersonal 
comparison and persuasive argumentation processes. One consists of 
experiments which try to determine if shifts in choice occur when either 
comparison processes or persuasive argumentation is prevented from 
occurring. Suffice to say that shifts are obtained following persuasive 
argumentation even when interpersonal comparison processes are 
minimized or precluded; they rarely occur, however, if interpersonal 
comparison can take place but persuasive argumentation is minimized 
or precluded (Burnstein & Vinokur, 1973; Burnstein et al., 1973; Clark 
et al., 1971; St. Jean, 1970; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). While a few studies 
have obtained shifts in choice under the latter conditions, in each case 
they have been rather attenuated ones (e.g., Clark & Willems, 1969; 
Teger & Pruitt, 1967). This research paradigm, therefore, provides con- 
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siderable evidence against comparison theories and for persuasive 
argumentation. 
The second strategy involves studies in which a person judges (a) 
how most others like him would choose or (b) what choice he admires. 
In general the former estimate tends to be less extreme, and the latter 
estimate, more extreme than the person’s own choice. These dis- 
crepancies are taken as evidence that individuals wish to outstrip each 
other in their adherence to particular social values, a hypothesis which 
is central to theories of interpersonal comparison. For instance, accord- 
ing to Brown (1965) Western culture positively values risk in certain 
decisions (or caution in other decisions); as a sign of his own competence 
or worth the individual wants to believe he is at least a.s risky (or 
cautious) as most others (Jellison & Riskind, 1970). This yearning to 
outshine in turn would lead to shifts in choice among relatively moderate 
individuals once they have had an opportunity to compare themselves 
with others. 
The finding that admired choices tend to be more extreme than one’s 
own choice is readily explained by the Levinger and Schneider (1969) 
or the Pruitt (1971b) version of interpersonal comparison theory, both 
of which assume that an individual’s decision is the result of a compromise 
between group norms and abstract ideals or extreme exemplars, Also, 
Brown’s formulation is vague enough to encompass the effect with no 
great strain. For instance, he might assert that actually choosing usually 
involves competing values (e.g., be bold but not foolhardy); while 
merely admiring is not so constrained. Thus, admiration is likely to be 
an unalloyed expression of the dominant value engaged by the decision 
(riskiness on decisions known to shift toward risk and cautiousness on 
those given to shifts toward caution). 
There are, however, other findings involving these discrepancies which 
do not make a great deal of sense in terms of the value adherence hypoth- 
esis. For instance, in the original Levinger and Schneider (1969) study, 
the self-ideal discrepancy appears to be a rather unreliable guide on 
cautious items (but not on risky items). In addition, the order in which 
the judgments are made has powerful effects, the discrepancies being 
much reduced when the choice of others or the ideal choice is made 
before one’s own choice (McCauley, Kogan, & Teger, 1971; Myers, 
1973a). On the other hand interpersonal comparison processes, according 
to these researchers, imply the reverse would occur. Being concerned about 
others’ choices or about admirable choices before getting down to one’s 
own preferences will make the value-adherence implications of the 
choice comparison (own vs others, or own vs admired) more salient than 
being unconcerned about these matters until after settling one’s own 
OWN, ADMIRED, AND ATTRIBUTED CHOICES 431 
preferences-especially since the person probably does not foresee that 
he will be asked immediately afterward to consider what others would 
choose or what choice he admires. Thus the discrepancy between own 
and others’ or admired choices should be greater if the former is made 
after rather than before the latter, which is not at all what was found. 
Finally, and most importantly, in their recent work Lamm, Tromms- 
dorff, and Rost-Schaude (1972) find no relationship between the magni- 
tude of the shifts and the self-other discrepancies, although a positive 
relationship should be obtained according to the value-adherence hypoth- 
esis. In spite of their previous research (Lamm, Schaude, & Trommsdorff, 
1971) these authors are now convinced that self-other discrepancies have 
no connection with the choice shift, a possibility also suggested by Cart- 
wright in his review ( 1971). According to the latter author, self-other 
discrepancies and choice shifts may well be causally unrelated, as the 
findings in Lamm et al. (1972) strongly suggest. Indeed, each effect may 
have its own separate and distinct causes which have nothing to do with 
value-adherence. If this is correct and if similar doubt can be raised in 
respect to the self-ideal discrepancy-that the latter is not a manifestation 
of value-adherence processes and/or is causally unrelated to shifts in 
choice-the remaining support for interpersonal comparison explanations 
is severely undermined. Our paper contains two studies dealing with 
these issues. The first concerns the self-other discrepancy and the second, 
the self-ideal discrepancy. 
EXPERIMENT I 
The finding that an individual’s own choice tends to be more extreme 
than that which he predicts for others is also consistent with at least one 
reasonably well established principle of social judgment, to wit: the more 
certain, confident, or intensely held the judgment, the more extreme its 
expression, say, on scales commonly used in attitude measurement (e.g., 
Suchman, 1950). The same type of finding has been obtained in research 
on the choice-shift, although little has been made of it. Thus, Clausen 
(1965) observed a positive correlation between extremeness of choice and 
the individual’s confidence in the choice. Similar findings were reported 
by Burnstein and Katz (1971). In addition, it is known that people who 
have made an extreme choice appear more influential and thus probably 
more confident to others (e.g., Burnstein, 1969; Marquis, 1962). Finally, 
Stroebe and Fraser (1971) have demonstrated that confidence in one’s 
choice and extremity of the choice are directly related for items which 
shift toward risk as well as those which shift toward caution. 
It may well be the case, therefore, that an individual selects a more risky 
course (on items shifting toward risk) or a more cautious one (on items 
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shifting toward caution) than that which he predicts others will choose 
because he is more confident or certain about his own preference than 
about the choice of others and not because he wishes to outshine others 
in adhering to cherished social values. 
Method 
Subjects and procedure. Forty-eight female undergraduates at the University of 
Provence ( Aix-en-Provence) participated as part of a course requirement. They were 
given a booklet labeled “Opinion Questionnaire” which contained five decision items 
which are standard in this area: number 2 and 8 from Stoner (1968) and number 
5, 8, and 11 from the Choice Dilemma Questionnaire (CDQ) of Kogan and Wallach 
(1964), very slightly modified for French subjects. On each item the subject first 
indicated her own choice of a “risk-level” according to the usual format (see Pruitt, 
1971a), that is, the minimum probability of success she would recommend in order 
to pursue a relatively attractive but uncertain course of action. She then indicated 
what in her opinion the majority of other students in psychology at the University 
of Provence would choose. Next, the subject indicated how confident and certain 
she was about her own choice and, finally, how confident and certain she was about 
the choice predicted for others. The latter judgments were made on a six-point 
scale ranging from “completely confident and certain” (scale value = 1) to “com- 
pletely unconfident and uncertain” (scale value = 6). 
Results 
Mean own and others’ choices as well as mean confidence ratings on 
items known to shift toward risk or caution are presented in Table 1. 
As in past studies, a subject’s own choice tends to be more extreme than 
the choice he attributes to others. Furthermore, as expected, she is con- 
siderably more confident and certain about the former than the latter. 
Out of the 240 choices made by our subjects, 192 (80%) were ones in 
which confidence in one’s own choice was greater than confidence in the 
TABLE 1 
MEAN OWN CHOICE, MEAN CHOICE ATTKIBUTED TO OTHERS, 





Choice of risk level Confidence in choice 
Own Others Difference Own Others Difference 
4.64” 5.56 .92* 2.32” 3.71 1.39** 
6.21 5.38 .t33* 2.24 3.43 1.19** 
1.57** 0.18 0.08 0.28 
5 1 = choice of 1 out of 10; 2 = choice of 2 out of 10, etc. 
b 1 = completely confident and certain; 6 = completely unconfident and uncertain. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .Ol. 
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others’ choice, 36 (15%) in which individuals were equally confident 
about own and others’ choices, and only 12 (5%) in which they were 
less confident about own than others’ choices. The relationship between 
cor&dence and the minimum acceptable probability for own and other’s 
choice averaged over items and over probability levels is shown in Fig. 1. 
The results for own choice are similar to those obtained by Stroebe and 
Fraser ( 1971) , that is, individuals are more confident about their own 
extreme choices than about moderate choices, both on items known to 
shift toward risk and on those known to shift toward caution, In ad- 
dition they were generally less certain about the choice predicted for 
others regardless of its extremity. For purposes of analysis the subjects’ 
mean confidence rating (I? = 1.73) for own extreme choices (those falling 
between either “1 out of 10” and “3 out of 10” or between “8 out of 10” 
and “10 out of 10”) was compared with their mean confidence rating 
(x = 3.55) for own moderate choices (those falling between “4 out of 
10” and “7 out of lo”). A t-test for correlated means indicates the differ- 
ence in confidence is significant at the .Ol level. A similar comparison 
between confidence ratings of extreme and moderate choices attributed 
to others did not approach traditional levels of statistical significance. 
EXPERIMENT II 
The discrepancy between what a person chooses and what he admires 
seems a straightforward indication of value adherence (and, thus, the 
potential for comparison processes inducing a shift in choice). First, an 
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FIG. 1. Confidence in choice as a function of the probability level chosen. 
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individual’s own choice tends to be less extreme than the admired choice. 
Thus, the discrepancy cannot be explained, as in our first experiment, by 
hypothesizing relatively greater certainty about the former.Z Second, ask- 
ing the person what he admires appears to have greater face-validity, to 
be a more direct guide to what is socially valued than asking him what 
he believes others would choose. 
The straightforwardness, however, does not hold up under closer 
inspection of the experimental results already available. If an extreme 
choice reflects adherence to a cherished social value, then the person 
who makes such a choice should be seen as generally (perhaps even 
morally) good, attractive, etc., while the relatively moderate individual 
should be judged as generally bad, repugnant, etc. Thus, for instance, a 
semantic-differential analysis of the ratings of extreme and moderate 
individuals should find at least as much (if not more) of the variance 
explained in terms of the evaluative factor as is explained in terms of 
potency and activity. The little data available present a different picture. 
Madaras and Bern ( 1968), though they argue for interpersonal com- 
parison theories, present results in which observers make rather small 
distinctions between high and low risk-taking individuals in terms of the 
evaluative dimension (e.g., good-bad), but marked distinctions in terms 
of potency (e.g., weak-strong) or activity (e.g., active-passive). Similarly, 
Lamm, Trommsdorff, and Rost-Schaude (1972) found that shifts in choice 
toward the extreme (risk) is directly related to judgments on activity and 
potency dimensions, but not to judgments on the evaluative dimension. 
This suggests that observers may infer something other than value- 
adherence from extreme choices. 
Let us now examine these findings in the light of the persuasive- 
arguments formulation. Consider the set of CDQ items standard in this 
area.3 This task has a subject read a description of a hypothetical situation 
‘Parenthetically, however, it does not seem out of the question that individuals 
may, in fact, be more certain about the action they admire than about what they 
would actually do in a specific instance. The latter appears to involve a larger number 
of contingencies-making for greater uncertainty-than the former. After all, it is 
not so uncommon to hear someone state he knows what he would like to do, but 
is not sure he will really do it in the particular circumstances. Were this the case, 
the same extremity-certainty relationship could account for the self-ideal discrepancy 
as well as the self-other discrepancy. 
a For those especially concerned about the generalizability of findings based on 
CDQ items, they should know that very similar effects have been observed by Myers 
and others on several decision tasks which are quite different from the CDQ task, 
e.g., the decisions having nothing to do with risk or minimum probabilities of success. 
This work is thoroughly reviewed in Myers ( 1973b) and his conclusions are not 
significantly different from our own. 
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in which the “hero” is confronted with a choice between a certain and an 
uncertain course of action. According to persuasive-arguments theory, 
choosing a minimum acceptable probability of success for pursuing the 
uncertain alternative requires the individual to consider arguments for 
and against the different courses of action, weigh their importance, and 
even make some inferences based on these ideas and on his familiarity 
with similar situations. Hence, the individual is literally engaged in 
probbm-solving rather than in risk-taking, and the arguments which come 
to mind function as part-solutions to the problem of choice rather than 
justification for derring-do. 
Suppose items of the CDQ type are seen as problems to be solved. Then 
it is reasonable to conjecture that observers may evaluate another’s choice 
largely in terms of its being well or poorly founded. In other words, since 
there is no objectively correct choice, the evaluation will reflect an infer- 
ence about the quality of the ideas or the persuasiveness of the arguments 
which we-and probably observers also-know determined the choice. 
Thus, an extreme preference may be admired because it is a sign of 
confidence, which in turn implies to observers that the person has avail- 
able a large number of persuasive reasons to support his preference. 
According to persuasive-arguments theory, because the observer is judg- 
ing the choice as a well or poorly founded solution, it is not surprising 
that he makes at least as strong inferences about the person’s creativity 
and rationality (e.g., see Jellison & Riskind, 1970) as about his goodness 
and attractiveness. 
In the present study, observers are given two cues about the thinking 
which has led an individual to make a specific choice-the direction of 
his choice and the confidence and certainty he expressed in his choice. 
Upon reading a particular CDQ item, the average observer is likely to 
think of more arguments in favor of one alternative, that is, for the un- 
certain alternative, on items which shift toward risk, and for the certain 
over the uncertain alternative on items which shift toward caution (Silver- 
thorne, 1971; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974). The observer, therefore, has 
an idea of which alternative has the most supportive argumentation and, 
in this specal sense, which is likely to be correct. If the person has 
selected the correct alternative and is certain about his choice, observers 
are likely to infer that he has available many good reasons for his choice. 
As a result, his solution to the dilemma is judged to be of high quality, 
as worthy of admiration (as is, of course, the person who devised the 
solution). On the other hand, if the person has selected the incorrect 
alternative and is uncertain, observers are likely to infer he has little 
reason for his choice, and his solution is of poor quality. These may be 
considered as limiting cases. Inference about the nature of the arguments 
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available to the person and the quality of his solution in the two remain- 
ing instances-a correct but uncertain choice and an incorrect but certain 
choice-should fall somewhere between these limiting cases. The critical 
point to keep in mind is that persuasive-argument theory predicts similar 
but independent effects for the direction of choice and for confidence in 
the choice. 
Interpersonal comparison theories suggest something different. The 
social value which dominates a choice supposedly is evident from the 
direction in which the latter shifts following interpersonal comparison. 
Thus on an item which shifts, say, toward risk, an extremely risky prefer- 
ence (or the person having this preference) is more admirable than a 
moderate one because the former conforms more to the cherished value. 
The homage should crescendo when the extremely risky individual is 
also highly certain and confident about his choice, this being a display 
of maximal adherence to the value. Consider now the soul who prefers 
an extremely cautious course of action on an item which shifts toward 
risk. According to the interpersonal comparison formulation, he should 
be castigated for rejecting something widely prized; and were he to 
indicate his rejection is firm, that he is certain and confident about his 
choice, the castigation should be even greater. Thus, interpersonal com- 
parison theories imply an interaction between the direction of a choice- 
whether it reflects conformity to or rejection of a widely held value-and 
certainty or confidence in the choice. That is to say, high confidence in a 
deviant choice, one which rejects a widely shared social value should 
lead to maximal disapproval, while high confidence in a conforming 
choice should lead to maximal approval. Such effects are standard in 
field and laboratory studies of conformity (e.g., Festinger, Schachter, 
& Back, 1950; Schachter, 1951). Nevertheless, this is clearly contrary to 
the prediction made by persuasive-arguments theory which implies ad- 
ditive (averaging) effects for correctness and confidence (see above). 
Our second study attempts to determine which of the two predictions is 
correct. 
Method 
Subjects. A total of 74 female students from the introductory courses in psychology 
at the University of Michigan participated in this experiment as part of their course 
requirement. 
Materials, procedure, and instructions. A set of eight CDQ items were chosen 
to include four risky and four cautious items. The four risky items were taken from 
the original CDQ set (Kogan & Wallach, 1964, Appendix E, numbers 1, 4, 6, and 7) 
as were two of the cautious items (numbers 2 and 3). The other two cautious items 
came from a questionnaire used by Stoner ( 1968, numbers 2 and 8, respectively, in 
his questionnaire). 
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Each choice dilemma item was accompanied by the standard instructions to 
choose-between odds of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 chances in lO--the lowest odds 
of success acceptable in order to recommend trying the uncertain alternative; or 
instead to indicate that this alternative should not be attempted, no matter what 
the odds. In the latter case, a response was scored as 10. In addition, at the bottom 
of each item the question of “How certain and confident are you of your above 
choice?’ was provided along with an II-point rating scale with “completely certain, 
confident” at one pole and “completely uncertain and unconfident” at the other pole. 
The eight items were contained in a questionnaire entitled “Opinion Questionnaire” 
and were preceded by the standard instructions, an explanation and an example. 
The items in each questionnaire were said to have been answered previously by 
different respondents and were assembled together in the booklet for purposes of 
the present study. Two check marks appeared on each item: one on the odds scale 
and one on the confidence scale. The placement of the check marks on the scales 
constitutes the experimental manipulation. They were arranged in the questionnaire 
to provide a 2 X 2 x 2 within subject orthogonal factorial design with 2 levels of 
risk, 2 levels of confidence and 2 levels of item type (i.e., risky vs cautious items). 
More specifically, for each item, the check mark on the odds scale was either placed 
on high risk ( 1 or 2 in 10) or on low risk (8 or 9 in lo), and the check mark on the 
confidence scale was either placed on high confidence (i.e., 10) or on low confidence 
(i.e., 4). (The complete orthogonal pattern of check marks for the risk and confidence 
scales appeared once in the four risky items and once in the four cautious items.) 
The items were assembled in the questionnaire so that each risky item was followed 
by a cautious item and each item with risky check mark ( 1, 2 in 10) was followed 
by an item with a cautious check mark (8, 9 in 10). Finally, the order of each 
specific item in the questionnaire varied so that across subjects, each item appears 
at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of the questionnaire as frequently as 
any other item. 
In addition to the “Opinion Questionnaire” which included the responses of 
hypothetical respondents each subject received the following instructions. “This is 
part of a study on how people judge others when there is not a great deal of 
information available on which to base such judgments. Several items from a large 
opinion survey will be presented in the booklet entitled “Opinion Questionnaire.” You 
will be told how people responded to a particular opinion item and how certain 
they were about their opinion. We ask you to read the instructions to the Opinion 
Questionnaire and then read each item at a time. Immediately after considering the 
responses of a particular individual to an item you will make several judgments about 
him in the following page. Do not worry about being right or wrong nor about 
being somewhat unsure of your judgement. Just make what you think is the most 
reasonable and straightforward judgment possible about the individual in the light 
of his responses to the item.” 
Following these instructions eight pages (a page per item) were provided with 
a set of B-point semantic differential rating scales. The subjects were told that each 
CDQ-type item had been answered by a different respondent and that they were 
to rate each respondent based on the choice he had made. 
The semantic differential scales that appeared on the page were highly loaded 
on the evaluation, activity, and potency dimensions of the semantic differential space 
(see Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957). The evaluation scales include intelligent- 
unintelligent, attractive-repelling, and admirable-not admirable. The activity scales 
include active-passive, hot-cold, and fast-slow. The potency scales include strong- 
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weak, severelenient, and hard-soft. The scales from the different dimensions were 
alternated as were the direction of the positive and negative poles. 
Two additional scales were included to assess inferences the subject might make 
about the reasoning which lay behind a choice. On the first subjects were merely 
asked to rate the person for his “sincerity” (sincere-insincere) in the semantic dif- 
ferential format. Then at the bottom of the page the subject was asked to “Suppose 
the respondent had to support his choice in an informal debate. How persuasive 
do you think his arguments would be?” A g-point scale was provided with “very 
persuasive arguments” at one pole and “very unpersuasive arguments” at the other 
pole. These measures would give a rough indication of how well-founded the choice 
was perceived to be by observers. 
Results 
A subject’s scores on scales belonging to the same semantic dimension 
were averaged. Along with our two measures of the “well-foundedness” 
of the choice, this gave 5 dependent variables (evaluation, activity, 
potency, sincerity, and persuasiveness) with the score of each varying 
from 1 (low) to 9 (high). A 2 X 2 X 2 X 5 analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on all factors was performed. The mean scores are 
shown in Table 2. The largest main effect is associated with the confidence 
factor [ (F( 1,73) = 81.832, p < .OOl], demonstrating that reliably higher 
evaluations are given if the respondent is certain and confident than if he 
is uncertain and unconfident, regardless of the direction of the choice. 
The next strongest effect is the interaction between item type and direc- 
tion of choice [F( 1,73) = 46.064, p < .OOl] indicating that risky 
preferences on items known to shift toward risky and cautious preferences 
on items known to shift toward caution are rated more highly than their 
respective opposites. An examination of the mean ratings on risky items 
TABLE 2 
MEAN RATINGS BY OBSERVERS OF RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE HIGH OR 
Low CONFIDENCE IN THEIR EXTREMELY RISKY OR CAUTIOUS CHOICE 
ON RISKY AND CAUTIOUS ITEMS 
Confidence0 
Risky items Cautious items 
Risky choice Cautious choice Risky choice Cautious choice 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Evaluation 6.27 5.72 5.12 4.83 4.67 4.39 6.10 5.29 
Activity 6.61 5.86 4.53 4.20 5.97 5.38 5.23 4.75 
Potency 6.11 5.17 5.38 4.65 5.98 5.49 5.23 4.78 
Persuasiveness 6.80 4.45 6.03 3.74 5.50 3.39 7.00 4.12 
Sincerity 6.59 5.32 6.53 5.29 5.89 4.73 6.92 5.99 
a Note: 1 = low; 9 = high. 
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reveals no case in which the ordering predicted by persuasive argument 
theory is violated, that is, the highly certain and risky respondent is 
viewed as most admirable, active, persuasive, and sincere while the 
cautious and uncertain respondent is seen as least admirable, active, etc., 
with risky but uncertain and cautious but certain respondents receiving 
intermediate ratings. On cautious items the predicted ordering is obtained 
for evaluation, persuasiveness, and sincerity, but not for activity or 
potency, leading to a significant second-order interaction-item type by 
rating dimensions by direction of choice [F( 4,292) = 7.123, p < .OOl]. 
The pattern of mean ratings for activity and potency on cautious items, 
however, are equally inconsistent with the order predicted by inter- 
personal comparison theories and suggest some stereotype about respond- 
ents who take long shots even when the correct or valued choice demands 
conservatism. 
Separate analyses of variance were preformed for each semantic 
differential dimension as well as on the two indices of the “well-founded- 
ness” of the choice. On evaluative ratings (e.g., good-bad) reliable effects 
are found for confidence [F( 1,737) = 14.362, p < .OOl] and for the 
interaction between item type and direction of choice [F( 1,733) = 
54.095, p < .OOl], indicating that h:gh confidence choices were rated 
more positively than low confidence ones, as were risky choices (com- 
pared to cautious choices) on risky items and cautious choices (compared 
to risky choices) on cautious items. Analysis of ratings of activity (e.g., 
fast-slow) demonstrate reliable effects for direction of choice [F( 1,73) = 
49.417, p < .OOl], confidence [F( 1,73) = 21.877, p < .OOl], and the 
interaction between item type and direction of choice [F( 1,73) = 30.573, 
p < .OOl]. A similar pattern is obtained on ratings of potency, that is, 
highly reliable effects for direction of choice [F( 1,73) = 41.822, p < 
.OOl], confidence [F( 1,73) = 43.970, p < .OOl], and the item type by 
direction of choice interaction [ F( 1,73) = 17.469, p < .OOl]. Thus ratings 
of activity and potency increased as both the riskiness and the confidence 
of the choices increased. Moreover, while risky choices were considered 
more “active” and more “potent” than cautious ones on items known to 
shift toward risk, comparable effects were not found for cautious choices 
(compared to risky ones) on items known to shift toward caution. 
Note that the results on evaluative rating are fully consistent with the 
persuasive-arguments formulation and not with theories of interpersonal 
comparison, that is, confidence and direction of choice have additive 
(averaging) effects. Similarly, ratings of activity and potency fit the 
former but not the latter set of theories. The main effect for direction 
of choice-that extremely risky choices lead to judgements of greater 
activity and potency regardless of item type-are predicted neither by 
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persuasive argumentation nor by interpersonal comparison. Indeed it is 
irrelevant to these two explanations of the choice-shift. What is most 
important is that confidence and correctness (direction of choice) have 
similar and independent effects, a finding which is contrary to interper- 
sonal comparison theories but totally consistent with persuasive 
argumentation. 
The same is true for results from our analysis of judgements of per- 
suasiveness and sincerity, where again we obtain significant effects for 
confidence ( persuasiveness : F( 1,73) = 132.083, p < 901; sincerity: 
F( 1,73) = 25.808, p < .OOl) and for the interaction between direction 
of choice and item type (persuasiveness: F( 1,73) = 24.875, p < .OOl; 
sincerity: F( 1,73) = 11.979, p < .OOl). In other words, confident choices 
were perceived as more persuasive and more sincere than unconfident 
ones as were risky choices (compared to cautious ones) on risky items 
and cautious choices (compared to risky ones) on cautious items. 
DISCUSSION 
Our evidence strongly suggests that while discrepancies involving 
own, attributed, and admired choices may be reliable events, they have 
little to do with a desire to outdo others in value adherence, as assumed 
by theories of interpersonal comparison. 
The first study simply demonstrated that a person tends to be more 
extreme in his own choice than in the choice he attributes to most others 
because he is more confident and certain about the former than the 
latter. The discrepancy, therefore, probably is caused by differential 
certainty rather than a desire to display adherence. This finding coupled 
with those in Lamm et al. (1972), where no relationship was observed 
between such discrepancies and actual shifts makes the interpersonal 
comparison interpretation of the difference between own and attributed 
choice rather tenuous. 
The second study examined the interpersonal comparison explanation 
of the finding that extreme choices (in the appropriate direction) are 
admired because they exemplify devotion to some widely held social 
ideal. Or put another way, moderate choices are frowned upon and 
extreme choices in the disvalued direction are condemned because they 
exemplify rejection of the value. Given such a hypothesis, it would seem 
to follow that an expression of great certainty and confidence in the 
choice should magnify admiration, when the choice is in the valued 
direction, or condemnation, when the choice is in the disvalued direction. 
Persuasive-arguments, on the other hand, assumes that an observer in 
large part judges a choice in terms of how correct or well-founded it is. 
OWN, ADMIRED, AND ATJ?RIRUTF,D CHOICES 441 
In past research this judgement was made on the basis of a single cue, 
the direction of choice. Since the observer knows to some degree which 
is the correct course of action, it is not surprising that he applauds re- 
spondents with relatively strong preferences for this alternative. In the 
present study he is given a second cue to the quality of the reasoning 
underlying a choice: the respondent’s certainty and confidence. This 
should influence his evaluation of the choice-but in a fashion different 
from that predicted by interpersonal comparison. That is to say, he 
should have more respect for preferences about which respondents are 
confident and certain than those about which they are unconfident and 
uncertain, independent of whether the preference is in the so-called 
valued or disvalued direction. 
Observers’ ratings on three semantic differential dimensions give fairly 
strong support to the persuasive-arguments formulation and not to inter- 
personal comparison. Moreover, the two relatively direct, albeit crude, 
indices of the quality of thought behind a choice-the respondent’s sin- 
cerity and potential persuasiveness-seems to demonstrate nicely that an 
observer is evaluating respondents in terms of their problem-solving 
and not in terms of value adherence. 
These findings, along with those mentioned earlier demonstrating 
that knowledge of others’ choice is neither a necessary nor sufficient 
condition for shifts in choice, suggest that interpersonal comparison 
theories do not provide a tenable explanation of this phenomenon. 
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